U.S.
Must Buy Assets to Prevent 'Tsunami', Gross Says - This
article
from Bloomberg discusses an influential report which has contributed to today's
stock market weakness. Here is the opening:
The U.S. government needs to start using more of its money to support markets
to stem a burgeoning ``financial tsunami,'' according to Bill Gross, manager of
the world's biggest bond fund.
Banks, securities firms and hedge funds are dumping assets, driving down prices
of bonds, real estate, stocks and commodities, Gross, co-chief investment officer
of Newport Beach, California-based Pacific Investment Management Co., said in
commentary posted on the firm's Web site today.
``Unchecked, it can turn a campfire into a forest fire, a mild asset bear market
into a destructive financial tsunami,'' Gross said. ``If we are to prevent a continuing
asset and debt liquidation of near historic proportions, we will require policies
that open up the balance sheet of the U.S. Treasury.''
The government needs to replace private investors who either don't have the money
to buy new assets or have been burned by losses, Gross said. Pimco, sovereign
wealth funds and central banks are reluctant to fund financial firms after losses
on investments they made to support the companies, Gross said. The world's biggest
banks and brokers have raised $364.4 billion in new capital after more than $500
billion in writedowns and credit losses since the beginning of last year.
Since financial markets seized up a year ago as the subprime-mortgage market collapsed,
the Standard & Poor's 500 Index has fallen 13 percent and home prices are
down more than 15 percent. Yields on investment-grade corporate bonds, debt backed
by commercial mortgages as well as credit cards reached record highs last month
relative to benchmark rates.
`Mom and Pop'
Gross cast a bleaker view for the prospects of the world's financial markets than
in previous notes to clients. The fund manager has previously called on lawmakers
to support housing with legislation passed in July that allows lenders to forgive
some of homeowners' debt and then refinance them into government-insured loans.
Pimco, a unit of Munich-based Allianz SE, is seeking to take advantage of declines
in home-loan bonds. The firm is raising as much as $5 billion to buy mortgage-backed
debt that has plunged in value, according to two investors with knowledge of the
matter. The Distressed Senior Credit Opportunities Fund will invest in securities
backed by commercial and residential mortgages, said the people, who asked not
to be identified because the fund is private.
Paulson Rescue
Treasury should support not only mortgage finance providers Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, but also ``Mom and Pop on Main Street U.S.A.,'' by subsidizing rates on home
loans guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration and other government institutions,
Gross said. A new version of the Resolution Trust Corp., which bought assets from
failing institutions during the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, may also
work, he said.
My view - This
is not a great time to be a central banker or treasury official. Bill Gross wants
more bailouts. He is probably right, in the interests of social stability, but
they obviously come at a price.
The actual report is posted in the Subscriber's Area.
Email of the day (1) - On
CRB Index:
"Thanks for the service, which has lost nothing in all the years we have known each other.
"Ref the old monthly CRB Index included in yesterday's comment do you have charts going back to beginning of 70s? There were 2 big tops in commodities (72 and 73 I think) caused by failure of Russian crops. It might prove interesting to compare with today's topping out process."
My comment - Thank you for your interest and I think it is great that so many of us maintain our enthusiasm for the markets.
We have as much back data in the Chart Library as we can get, and our own system can contain up to 50-years of history, which we fortunately have for the CRB indices. To see this, or maximum back history for any other instrument, just bring up a weekly or monthly chart in the normal fashion, then click on the 'Charting' function (black bar upper left), change the time 'Period' to '50 Years (max)' and then click 'Apply'. You can also save it in your favourites, should you wish to.
For general interest, I have reproduced the Old CRB (CCI) over 50 years, on both an arithmetic and semi-log basis. And for good measure I have included the current CRB Index (CRY), which you can also see on both an arithmetic and semi-log basis. For additional perspective, we also have inflation-adjusted (CPI) charts for CCI on both arithmetic and semi-log scales, and also inflation-adjusted CRB, arithmetic and semi-log.
I could show you far more in terms of customisable indices for commodities or anything else, but that would be showing off and I do not wish to test your patience. So let's cut to the chase - where are we in terms of 'commodity bubbles' or 'supercycles', and what are the parallels with the 1970s, if any?
This item continues in the Subscriber's Area.
Email of the day (2) - On
oil and other bubbles:
"My take remains oil's rise and spike along with everything else was part of a crack up boom fueled by excessive credit now coming unwound just as it now explains rising $ as the scramble for liquidity intensifies with the shrinking current account deficit in the US and lenders unwilling to lend in addition. The Fed has destroyed its balance sheet and it is just starting. Between 2002 and 2007, the inverse of $ and virtually every other asset correlated as credit expansion fueled the boom. At the same time, we had growing current account imbalances now also coming unwound and that was equally a pivotal issue in having driven asset prices to extremes not supported the ability to service debts under them. Both the credit bubble and the current account imbalances explain rising asset prices during the bubble period and now falling asset prices that were propped up by credit and these cross border and unsustainable capital flows. Even houses in the Hamptons are down 10-20% as the rot spreads and option ARMS haven't started resetting, a bigger problem than sub primes. Plus, boomer children have 72% more debt than their parents did at the same age so they can't afford to buy homes in any case especially now proper underwriting will be done. Boomers start retiring over the next few years. In their 50's there is one buyer for every seller and by age 70, there are 3 sellers for every buyer and it is 9 to 1 by 80, a perfect storm indeed for continuing housing problems. There are demographic issues that are equally problematic for housing and looming Medicare and Social Security shortfalls. Between 1980 and 2000, there was a 20% increase in the native-born, English speaking, college-educated 25-54 year old group that was part of the fuel in the housing bubble. Between 2000 and 2020, there is no increase in this 25-54 age group with the same demographics so who will pay for the $99 Trillion unfunded liabilities. That is Pete Peterson's number. That gets us back to why M-3 was done away with, but that is another story.
"A buddy of mine who trades electricity and manages money for quite a few professional golfers was just in Singapore and spent some time with Jim Rogers who now lives there. He noted Rogers was profoundly pessimistic that the credit bubble would continue to implode for years to come with predictably bad consequences. Soros says the same in his new book and in interviews. Even smart guys like Joe Lewis and Sam Zell totally missed what was happening with credit run amok and paid the price with the Bears Stearns debacle with Lewis losing close to $1 Billion and problems at the Tribune respectively with the debt taken on to buy it now selling for cents on the $.
"August 2007 was as seminal as August 1971 when Nixon closed the gold window allowing for credit to expand exponentially until at the denouement it took $6 of credit to generate $1 of US GDP. In 2007, the world started to realize the emperor was naked. The adjustment process in asset prices started and it is global.
"As a PS, the hubris of Putin, Chavez, and Ahmadinejad along with new tall buildings in Moscow and the Middle East were signals crude was in a topping process."
My comment - Thanks for an informative and lucid summary of your thoughts, not least regarding how many of these events are interconnected. I also appreciate your finished copy, so that I all I had to do was copy and paste.
Perhaps I have been lucky to live and invest in an era where neither the US economy nor stock market ever fulfilled my worst fears. However you have knowledgeably detailed concerns which are more than capable of giving me restless nights.
We need to be aware of the risks you mention, as well as more optimist views, not least because combined; they should help us to remain objective when monitoring trends in the markets.
Today's interesting charts -
The Library has 'Help' features and tutorials to enable newcomers to navigate
over 17,000 customisable instruments more efficiently.
My
personal portfolio: Three trading positions closed - Details
and charts are in the Subscriber's Area.
USA (30-Year T-Bond futures) - Steadied
within recent trend once again; would require close beneath 116.55 to offset
current scope for an additional test of previous resistance.
This section continues in the Subscriber's Area.
Please note - Eoin is away
until 9th September.
Comments [0]





| Coverage Universe |
Investment Banking Clients (IBC) | ||||
| Stock Rating Category |
Count |
% of Total |
Count |
% of Total IBC |
% of Rating Category |
| Overweight/Buy |
892 |
41% |
299 |
45% |
34% |
| Equal-weight/Hold |
936 |
43% |
277 |
42% |
30% |
| Underweight/Sell |
367 |
17% |
87 |
13% |
24% |
| Total |
2,195 |
663 |
|||
Comments [0]





| Coverage Universe |
Investment Banking Clients (IBC) | ||||
| Stock Rating Category | Count | % of Total | Count |
% of Total IBC | % of Rating Category |
| Overweight/Buy | 909 | 42% | 290 | 45% | 32% |
| Equal-weight/Hold | 913 | 42% | 270 | 42% |
30% |
| Underweight/Sell | 348 | 16% | 83 | 13% | 24% |
| Total | 2,170 |
| 643 | ||
Comments [0]






| Coverage Universe |
Investment Banking Clients (IBC) | ||||
| Stock Rating Category | Count | % of Total | Count |
% of Total IBC | % of Rating Category |
| Overweight/Buy | 909 | 42% | 290 | 45% | 32% |
| Equal-weight/Hold | 913 | 42% | 270 | 42% |
30% |
| Underweight/Sell | 348 | 16% | 83 | 13% | 24% |
| Total | 2,170 |
| 643 | ||
Comments [0]


| Coverage Universe |
Investment Banking Clients (IBC) | ||||
| Stock Rating Category | Count | % of Total | Count |
% of Total IBC | % of Rating Category |
| Overweight/Buy | 909 | 42% | 290 | 45% | 32% |
| Equal-weight/Hold | 913 | 42% | 270 | 42% |
30% |
| Underweight/Sell | 348 | 16% | 83 | 13% | 24% |
| Total | 2,170 |
| 643 | ||
Comments [0]



| Coverage Universe |
Investment Banking Clients (IBC) | ||||
| Stock Rating Category | Count | % of Total | Count |
% of Total IBC | % of Rating Category |
| Overweight/Buy | 909 | 42% | 290 | 45% | 32% |
| Equal-weight/Hold | 913 | 42% | 270 | 42% |
30% |
| Underweight/Sell | 348 | 16% | 83 | 13% | 24% |
| Total | 2,170 |
| 643 | ||
Comments [0]


| Coverage Universe |
Investment Banking Clients (IBC) | ||||
| Stock Rating Category | Count | % of Total | Count |
% of Total IBC | % of Rating Category |
| Overweight/Buy | 909 | 42% | 290 | 45% | 32% |
| Equal-weight/Hold | 913 | 42% | 270 | 42% |
30% |
| Underweight/Sell | 348 | 16% | 83 | 13% | 24% |
| Total | 2,170 |
| 643 | ||
Comments [0]
Comments [0]